With
the announcement of quarter one GDP growth rate at 5.7%—the lowest in the last
six quarters—and industrial growth rate for April-July being at 1.7%, down from
6.5% in the comparable period of last year, besides, current account deficit at
2.4% and inflation slowly inching forward to 3.4%, everyone is looking up to
the forthcoming monetary policy announcement by the RBI eagerly.
The
RBI Governor is thus caught in a complex situation: if he cuts the rate to
support growth, and if inflation picks up, no one would spare him. On the other
hand, staying put with his hawkish attitude towards containing inflation, if he
does not cut the rate, and if growth continues to slide, he will be dubbed as a
governor who is not for growth.
Given
the fact that inflation is inching up owing to rise in food and fuel prices that
are anyway outside the purview of monetary policy and that the RBI inflation models
being good enough, that too, consistently to overestimate inflation growth, the
Governor may, some opine, better take a chance to cut the policy interest
rates.
And
here rises the real issue: given the existence of excess capacities in the industry,
will the rate cut create fresh demand for credit from the industry? It may not,
more so in the light of the fact that lending to industry has shrunk in the last
two years—for the first time in the last two decades—as against a growth rate
of almost 30% recorded earlier.
Infrastructure
projects are stalled at various stages of execution for quite some time for
reasons galore, and those which were executed particularly from the sectors of
power and telecom are in the doldrums. That aside, the overall poor consumer
demand across the sectors has adversely affected the cash flows of companies. As
a result, their balance sheets are saddled with huge burden of debts. This in
turn is affecting the balance sheets of banks, for 20% of their loans have
either turned bad or warranting restructuring. One estimate of likely losses that
PSBs may incur owing to bad debts puts it at ₹1
tn. Its obvious impact is: slowdown in credit flow to industry—at least that is
what some argue. Nevertheless, it is true that unless this ‘twin deficit’
problem is resolved, a mere cut in policy interest rate by 25 to 50 bps could
hardly boost the growth in economy.
The
government is, of course, aware of the scale of recapitalization needed and
there is an indication too that it may resort to a tool like ‘recapitalization bonds’—the
government will inject capital into banks and banks in turn will use the said
capital to buy government bonds—but fearing that it may adversely impact
fiscal-deficit, it appears to hold it back. The other alternative under
consideration is: merger of bad banks with good banks to create robust balance sheets.
But the question is: where are the good banks? For, all PSBs are equally infested
with bad debts.
That
said, we must also remember that mergers are essentially meant for leveraging
on ‘synergies’ likely to emerge out of the merging units but not for creating
big balance sheets. And so far as synergies are concerned, there are hardly
any, for each bank has its own peculiar problem with balance sheet and style of
operating—even their operating technologies widely differ. And when it comes to
credit culture, the less said, the better. For, cyclical down-trends impacting the
balance sheets of businesses is a recurring phenomenon. In the light of these
realities, merging ailing banks without first setting right their balance sheets
will only create new problems.
So,
the only alternative is: under the contemplated fiscal stimulus, the government
may infuse capital into banks, for it indirectly makes fresh capital available
for industry to invest afresh. Or, the owner may take a call for privatizing, at
least, some banks to begin with. This move shall also help banks to retain their
existing network advantage in tact while effective and healthy competition is
created among banks, which incidentally can result in the much desired
effective management in the banking sector. But in one way or other act it
must, for delay would only make things far worse.
Simultaneously
must continue to pressurise the banks: one, to pursue recovery of bad debts
through IBC with greater vigour and two, to build and nurture better credit culture.
No comments:
Post a Comment