The
government’s proposal to recapitalize the Public Sector Banks (PSBs) by
injecting a massive Rs 2.11 tn with the sole motive of “support[ing] credit
growth and job creation”, is a “decisive package to restore the health of the
Indian banking system and a monumental step forward in safeguarding the
country’s economic future.” As the RBI Governor
observed, the timing of the move too is equally laudable, for it has been taken
at a time when all the macroeconomic fundamentals of the country are quite
sound.
Equally
worth appreciating is the government’s style of mobilizing capital for
recapitalization: It proposes to mobilize Rs 18,139 cr through budgetary
provision and an additional Rs 1.35 lakh crore by issuing recapitalization
bonds, while the rest of the amount is expected to be raised by banks
themselves through public issue.
Issue of
recapitalization bonds is a deft move for reasons galore: one, it enables the
government to front-load capital injection while it could stagger the
accompanying fiscal implications over a period of time; two, mobilization of
such a staggering amount would not pose a problem for the government since
banks are sitting pretty with huge cash surpluses owing to the recent
demonetization; three, issue of recapitalization bonds will be liquidity
neutral for the government except for the interest expense that will contribute
to its annual fiscal deficit;four, it also enables banks to rope in private
investors by accessing capital market to mobilize a part of the envisaged
amount; and five, the exercise of recapitalization of banks is taking into
account not only the current NPAs of banks,
but also what is likely to happen in the coming two years. Thus the
whole game plan, as the RBI Governor commented, is flavoured by “several
desirable features”.
However,
there are critics who are averse to the government recapitalizing ailing banks
at a cost to the exchequer. The fear of ‘moral hazard’ has also been brought in
by these critics. According to them, it is the government’s ownership of the
banks and the resulting inefficiency in their governance that is mainly
responsible for the costly bailout, that too, at frequent intervals and hence
advocate banks’ privatization.
They
might be partly right for there is much to be desired in the way the banks are today
governing themselves. But bailing out of banks from financial crisis is not
unique to India alone. Indeed, major banks, though privately owned in western
countries, have experienced periodic bouts of such failures. Incidentally, IMF
statistics indicate as many as 140 episodes of banking crisis in 115 countries
during the period 1970 to 2011 and the cost of recapitalization of the banks in
these countries was said to be around 7% of GDP. As against this, India’s cost
of recapitalization is perhaps less than 1% of GDP over the last two
decades. This, of course, doesn’t mean
that India need not be concerned about the huge cost underlying the
recapitalization of banks.
Obviously,
when viewed against this backdrop, government’s
present action of launching “a comprehensive and coherent” plan of action to
address the whole gamut of banking sector ills in one go well fits into the
reform mantra that pundits are talking about all along. However, the government
must adopt a calibrated approach of funding the balance sheets of such banks
which are ready to clean up their mess effectively and could quickly undertake
credit dispensation in preference to those who are slogging to come to terms
with the correction warranted. Such a move shall inject a kind of discipline too
among the players, which is sure to be appreciated by the capital market when
they approach it for equity.
Over and above it, what is more
important for this move to succeed is: empowering the Bank managements to take
quick decisions regarding one-time settlements or on writing off of NPAs by
affording protection for commercial decisions from the agencies like Central
Vigilance, CBI, etc. As Deepak Parekh, Chairman, HDFC, observed, “Let a
situation like IDBI Bank executives not happen.” For, that is sure to dampen
the will of executives to take critical decisions.
At the same time, government,
being the major stakeholder, must encourage banks to pursue recovery of bad
debts aggressively through all the available means, including launching
insolvency proceedings under the recently launched IBC against the defaulting
borrowers. Here again, desisting its temptations to dole out political favours,
government must stay away from the banks’ decisions relating to management of
bad debts. Simultaneously, government should strengthen the tribunals to
dispense judgements under insolvency petitions with no time losses. Aggressive
pursuit of bad debts through IBC, is of course, sure to create crisis like
situation in the business circles, but it is a must to give a befitting
treatment to the erring investor so that others are deterred from resorting to
such deliberate acts defaulting from repayment of bank loans.
The next priority for banks wold
be focusing on their credit-culture: the “unique combination of policies,
practices, experience and management attitudes that defines the lending
environment and determines lending behavior acceptable to the bank.” It
manifests as the “shared belief of lending being done on the basis of prudent,
commercial and profit-oriented criteria. Any deviation from the line is likely
to result in lending being done for non-commercial reasons and in the process
end-up in poor quality loan assets. A poor credit culture of a bank may ultimately
result in: NPAs. The owner should therefore demand from the managements to hone
up the credit culture. And as a first
step in this direction, the owner of the banks, the Government, should exhibit
moral courage to distance itself from the credit decisions being taken by
banks. For, any such intervention is
certain to skew the credit decisions of banks leading to the flow of capital
into wrong hands, which ultimately tends to end up as bad debt. Secondly, it is
only through such distancing itself from the decision making in banks that
the government can demand accountability
from the mandarins of the banks for the right management of capital placed in
their hands.
This should be followed by constitution
of bank boards with professionals backed by proven track record, particularly
with people of upright character. Secondly, CEOs must be selected transparently
and they must enjoy a fixed term of minimum five years. Indeed, a thorough
revamping of banks’ HR Policies is what is immediately called for to realize
the full benefits of the proposed recapitalization. Else, NPAs being of recurring
nature, tend to resurface soon.
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